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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 George Totimeh, a native of Liberia, seeks relief from 
the order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that he be removed 
from the United States.  In these consolidated petitions for 
review, he seeks review of decisions by the Board of 
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Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) declining to remand or reopen 
his case and dismissing his appeal.1
I. Facts and Procedural History 
  We decide whether the 
BIA erred in holding that Totimeh’s conviction under 
Minnesota’s predatory offender registration statute was a 
crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  We also decide 
whether the BIA abused its discretion in not reopening his 
case to allow him to supplement the administrative record 
with evidence regarding when he first was admitted legally to 
the United States.  We grant the petitions, reverse the BIA’s 
holding regarding Totimeh’s conviction under the predatory 
offender registration statute, and remand to the BIA with 
instructions to allow Totimeh to supplement the record to 
show that he was legally admitted to the United States in July 
1980 and to enter an order that he is not removable under 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA.  We thus vacate the order of 
removal. 
Totimeh was inspected and admitted to the United 
States at New York City as a B-1 visitor in July 1980.  Soon 
thereafter, he moved to Minnesota to attend a university, 
whereupon his status was changed to an F-1 student.  On May 
8, 1983, he was granted an adjustment of status to that of a 
lawful permanent resident.      
In January 1988, Totimeh pled guilty to criminal 
sexual conduct in the fourth degree.  In 1995, Minnesota 
enacted a predatory offender registration statute, Minn Stat. 
                                              
1 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6), our review of Totimeh’s 
petition for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to 
reopen his case was consolidated with our review of the 
underlying order of removal. 
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§ 243.166, which requires persons to register if convicted of 
criminal sexual conduct.  Totimeh complied with the statute’s 
requirements for approximately three years, until he moved to 
a friend’s apartment without notifying the authorities of this 
change of address.  In April 1998, he pled guilty to failing to 
comply with the statute’s registration requirement.     
On October 29, 2009, the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) began removal proceedings against 
Totimeh by filing a Notice to Appear.  The Notice stated that 
he was admitted to the United States on May 8, 1983.  DHS 
alleged that Totimeh was removable pursuant to two 
provisions of the INA: (1) based on his 1988 conviction, he 
was removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), for having been convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude committed within five years after 
his “date of admission” and for which a sentence of one year 
or longer may be imposed; and (2) based on his 1998 
conviction, coupled with his 1988 conviction, he was 
removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two crimes 
involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme 
of criminal misconduct.    
When Totimeh first appeared before the IJ, he 
conceded the factual allegations in the Notice to Appear, 
including that he was admitted to the United States in May 
1983.  He also conceded that his 1988 conviction was a crime 
involving moral turpitude, but denied that his 1998 conviction 
under Minnesota’s predatory offender registration statute was 
an offense of moral turpitude.   
In February 2010, the IJ issued an interlocutory ruling 
in connection with Totimeh’s request for release from DHS 
5 
 
custody on bond,2
Several months later, Totimeh asserted for the first 
time that he was admitted to the United States in July 1980, 
not May 1983.  Establishing the July 1980 admission would 
have nullified the ground for removing him that 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA provided based on his 1988 
conviction.  However, he did not support his assertion with 
any evidence in the record.  Therefore, the IJ ruled that 
Totimeh had been admitted as a legal permanent resident in 
May 1983, continued to find him removable under 
§§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) of the INA, and ordered him 
removed to Liberia. 
 finding that he was removable under both 
provisions of the INA cited by the DHS.  Totimeh’s 
admissions indicated that he was removable under 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i) for being convicted of a crime of moral 
turpitude within five years of his admission to the United 
States.  The IJ held as well that Totimeh’s 1998 conviction 
was for a crime involving moral turpitude (and thus he also 
was removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)).  The latter ruling 
relied on the BIA’s decision in In re Tobar-Lobo, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 143 (BIA 2007), whereby it concluded that failure to 
register as a sex offender in violation of California’s sex 
offender registration act was a crime involving moral 
turpitude.  
Totimeh appealed to the BIA.  In affirming the IJ, it 
similarly relied on Tobar-Lobo to hold that Totimeh was 
removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii).  It also cited In re Shanu, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 754 (BIA 2005), for its holding that the term 
“date of admission” includes an adjustment of status and that 
an adjustment of status qualifies as a “date of admission” 
under § 237(a)(2)(A)(i).  Thus, per the BIA’s reasoning, even 
                                              
2 Totimeh had been placed in DHS custody for a separate 
offense unrelated to the charges underlying his removability. 
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had Totimeh offered sufficient proof of his July 1980 
admission, he still would have been removable under that 
subsection of the INA because his change in status to a 
permanent legal resident in May 1983 made that a date of 
admission as well. 
After filing his petition for review of the BIA’s 
decision, Totimeh filed a motion with the BIA to reopen his 
case so that he might supplement the record with 
documentary evidence obtained through a request under the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552.3
Before it ruled on the motion to reopen, the BIA 
decided Matter of Alyazji, 25 I. & N. Dec. 397 (BIA 2011), in 
which it amended its holding in Shanu, explaining that “date 
  This 
evidence established his July 1980 admission, showing that 
he was admitted on a B-1 visa on July 20, 1980, and that his 
status was changed to an F-1 student in December 1980, 
conditioned on his pursuing a full course of study and 
completing his studies no later than June 1984.  The evidence 
further showed that, as of September 1982, Totimeh was not 
enrolled in a full course of study. 
                                              
3 The documentary evidence that Totimeh obtained through 
his FOIA request was controlled by the Government, which 
necessarily possessed the information at the time that 
Totimeh first asserted to the IJ that he was admitted to the 
United States in July 1980.  It is strange that the Government 
did not provide this information to Totimeh or the IJ at the 
time the former asserted his correct admission date, and 
instead forced him to seek out the documents through a FOIA 
request.  This resulted in unnecessary delay, an additional 
written decision by the BIA, and an additional appeal to us.  
We expect that the Government will respond (and quickly) in 
the future with such information in similar circumstances.  
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of admission,” as used in § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA, refers 
to the single “date of admission by virtue of which the alien 
was present in the United States when he [or she] committed 
[the] crime.”  Id. at 406.  The BIA nonetheless found that the 
evidence regarding Totimeh’s July 1980 admission was 
immaterial to his removability under § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) 
because his May 1983 adjustment of status was the single 
date of admission relevant to his 1988 conviction.  Thus, 
though acknowledging Alyazji superseded Shanu, the BIA 
denied the motion to reopen.  
Totimeh and the Government agree that we must 
decide whether violating Minnesota’s predatory offender 
registration statute is a crime involving moral turpitude for 
purposes of § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA.  If it is not, we then 
must decide whether, pursuant to the BIA’s decision in 
Alyazji, the five-year period “after the date of admission” for 
purposes of § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA should be calculated 
based on Totimeh’s May 1983 adjustment of status to a 
lawful permanent resident or his earlier 1980 admission date.4
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
   
The IJ has jurisdiction over Totimeh’s removal 
proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.  The BIA had 
jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1103.  
It had jurisdiction over the motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7).  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to 
review the BIA’s final order of removal and denial of the 
motion to reopen.     
                                              
4 Totimeh initially argued that the BIA’s holding in Shanu 
contravened the plain language of § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the 
INA.  In light of the BIA’s clarification of Shanu in Alyazji, 
both Totimeh and the Government agree that Alyazji controls, 
and neither party disputes the BIA’s holding in that case.   
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Because the BIA rendered its own opinion regarding 
Totimeh’s removability under the INA, we review the 
decision of the BIA and not the IJ.  Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 
239, 240 (3d Cir. 2004).  We review the BIA’s conclusions of 
law de novo, “but will afford Chevron deference to the BIA’s 
reasonable interpretations of statutes which it is charged with 
administering.”  Luntungan v. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 551, 555 
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 
211 (3d Cir. 2005)).  The BIA’s determination of whether a 
specific crime involves moral turpitude qualifies for Chevron 
deference.  Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 87 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984), “[i]f congressional intent is clear from the 
statute’s language, we must give effect to it as written.”  
Knapik, 384 F.3d at 87.  If a statute “is silent or ambiguous, 
we must decide if the agency’s action is based on ‘a 
permissible construction of the statute.’”  Id. (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).  Except for its conclusions of law, 
we review the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen for abuse 
of discretion.  Luntungan, 449 F.3d at 555. 
III. Crime Involving Moral Turpitude 
Whether a conviction under a state law is a crime of 
moral turpitude calls for “a ‘categorical’ approach, ‘focusing 
on the underlying criminal statute rather than the alien’s 
specific act.’”  Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 465 
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Knapik, 384 F.3d at 88).  We consider 
“what the convicting court must necessarily have found to 
support the conviction and not [] other conduct in which the 
defendant may have engaged in connection with the offense.”  
Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381-82 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 
2001)).          
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The BIA has defined “moral turpitude” as “conduct 
that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the 
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed other persons, 
either individually or to society in general.”  Knapik, 384 F.3d 
at 89.  “[I]t is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory 
prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral 
turpitude.”  Matter of Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (BIA 
1980).  Moral turpitude also may “inhere in serious crimes 
committed recklessly, i.e., with a conscious disregard of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that serious injury or death 
would follow.”  Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 414 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  See also Knapik, 384 F.3d at 90 (deferring to the 
BIA’s determination that reckless endangerment is a crime 
involving moral turpitude); Matter of Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 
611, 613 (BIA 1976) (concluding “that moral turpitude can 
lie in criminally reckless conduct”).  We thus have stated that 
“[t]he ‘hallmark’ of moral turpitude [is] ‘a reprehensible act 
with an appreciable level of consciousness or deliberation.’”  
Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 276 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Partyka, 417 F.3d at 414).         
The Minnesota predatory offender registration statute 
that Totimeh violated defined the offense as “knowingly 
violat[ing] any of [the statute’s] provisions or intentionally 
provid[ing] false information.”  Minn. Stat. § 243.166.5 
(1998).5
                                              
5 All references to the statute reflect how it read when 
Totimeh was convicted under it in April 1998.  It currently 
provides that “[a] person required to register under [the 
statute] who knowingly violates any of its provisions or 
intentionally provides false information . . . is guilty of a 
felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more 
than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than 
$10,000, or both.”  Minn. Stat. § 243.166.5(a) (2011).  In 
  The statute required persons to register by providing 
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a signed statement “giving information required by the bureau 
of criminal apprehension,” a fingerprint card, and a 
photograph.  Id. at § 243.166.4(a).  The statute also required 
registered offenders to provide a written notice of a change in 
residence at least five days before changing residence.  Id. at  
§ 243.166.3(b).6
The BIA concluded that a conviction under 
Minnesota’s registration statute was a crime of moral 
turpitude by relying on its decision in Tobar-Lobo, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. at 143, regarding offenses under California’s similar 
registration statute.  The majority of a split BIA panel focused 
on the California statute’s purpose of sheltering citizens from 
dangerous sex offenders:  “Given the serious risk involved in 
a violation of the duty owed by this class of offenders to 
society, we find that the crime [of willfully violating any of 
the statute’s requirements] is inherently base or vile and 
therefore meets the criteria for a crime involving moral 
turpitude.”  Id. at 146.  The dissent objected that the statute 
swept so broadly as to convict individuals for reasons not 
involving “evil intent or a corrupt mind,” creating a 
regulatory offense traditionally viewed as lacking the 
depravity necessary for moral turpitude.  Id. at 148.  But the 
 
                                                                                                     
1998, the statute provided that an offense under it was a gross 
misdemeanor, unless the offender previously had been 
convicted under the statute, in which case the additional 
offense was a felony.  Minn. Stat. § 243.166.5 (1998).      
6 The statute currently sets out a detailed list of information 
an offender must provide.  Minn. Stat. § 243.166.4a(a) 
(2011).  It further provides that the person must immediately 
inform the proper authorities if any of this information is no 
longer valid because of a change in circumstances.  Id. at 
§ 243.166.4a(b).     
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majority reasoned that “[s]ome obligations, once imparted by 
proper notification, are simply too important not to heed.  
That is, even if ‘forgotten,’ an offense based on a failure to 
fulfill the offender’s duty to register contravenes social mores 
to such an extent that it is appropriately deemed 
turpitudinous.”  Id. at 146–47.      
Federal Courts of Appeals have criticized the BIA’s 
conclusion in Tobar-Lobo.  See Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 
918 (10th Cir. 2011); Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 
738 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by 
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009).  
In the most recent case — Efagene, holding that a conviction 
under Colorado’s similar registration statute is not a crime 
involving moral turpitude — the Tenth Circuit Court 
explained that the BIA’s reasoning so departs from 
longstanding precedent of what constitutes moral turpitude as 
to render the BIA’s interpretation unreasonable even under 
Chevron deference.  642 F.3d at 922-25.  The Court noted 
that the BIA relied on cases holding that offenses of rape, 
child abuse, and spousal abuse are crimes of moral turpitude.  
They involve intentional conduct, identifiable victims and 
actual harm, and are deemed wrong by society independent of 
any statutory prohibition.  It contrasted those crime types with 
regulatory offenses—such as filing, reporting, and licensing 
requirements—which historically have been held not to 
involve moral turpitude.  Id. at 922-23 (reviewing BIA and 
Courts of Appeals’ decisions that various regulatory offenses 
are not crimes involving moral turpitude).  Similar to these 
regulatory offenses, the Colorado statute prohibited conduct 
that society deemed wrong only because it required that 
certain actions be taken, not because, “as a categorical matter, 
[it] involve[d] an identifiable victim, any actual harm, or any 
intent to cause harm.”  Id. at 922.  The result was that, under 
longstanding BIA precedent, violating the Colorado 
regulatory statute did not qualify as a crime of moral 
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turpitude, and the BIA’s contrary decision was not entitled to 
deference. 
Moreover, Efagene further underscored the 
unreasonableness of the BIA’s interpretation of moral 
turpitude in Tobar-Lobo by noting that “the rationale for the 
decision could apply to any and every criminal infraction.”  
642 F.3d at 925.  “Were moral turpitude to reach any breach 
of duty to society, or the failure to meet any obligation ‘too 
important not to heed,’ the words ‘moral turpitude’ would be 
rendered superfluous and a noncitizen would be removable if 
convicted of ‘two or more crimes’ of any kind.”  Id.    
We join this path of analysis.  First, based on how 
Minnesota’s courts apply it, the statute prescribes an offense 
that can be committed without intent, indeed simply by 
forgetfulness.  State v. Dekraai, 2008 WL 72829, at *3 
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2008) (“It is a status crime because 
you do not have to do anything wrong to be guilty of 
it . . . .”); State v. Delapaz, 2007 WL 1976668, at *6 (Minn. 
Ct. App. July 10, 2007) (“The evidence . . . showed that 
appellant knew he was required to register within five days of 
his move, and his reasons for failing to register did not excuse 
him.”).  Moreover, Minnesota’s courts have described the 
statute as regulatory and designed to assist law enforcement.  
See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 2010) 
(“[T]he primary purpose of [Minn. Stat. § 243.166] is to 
create an offender registry to assist law enforcement with 
investigations.”) (quoting Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 
711, 717 (Minn. 1999)).       
Second, the statute does not regulate a crime that of 
itself is inherently vile or intentionally malicious.  Sexual 
assault, child abuse, and spousal abuse are no doubt 
inherently vile and elicit strong outrage.  But this outrage is 
directed at the underlying crimes that resulted in the passage 
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of offender registration statutes such as that in Minnesota; the 
independent act of failing to register or update a registration 
as a predatory offender is not, as a category of crime, an 
inherently despicable act.   
In addition to the Minnesota statute bearing neither of 
the traditional hallmarks of a crime involving moral turpitude, 
evil intent or a vile act, the BIA’s interpretation of that statute 
also contradicts its precedent of what constitutes a crime 
involving moral turpitude under the INA.  See, e.g., In re 
Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775, 776 (BIA 1968) (“We 
have many times held that the violation of a regulatory, or 
licensing, . . . provision of a statute is not a crime involving 
moral turpitude.”).  “An agency interpretation of a relevant 
provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier 
interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than 
a consistently held agency view.”  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 
259, 273 (1981)).   
In this context, the BIA’s determination that 
Minnesota’s predatory offender registration statute is a crime 
involving moral turpitude as a categorical matter for purposes 
of the INA is wrong as a matter of law and is not entitled to 
Chevron deference.7
                                              
7 Totimeh urges that if we determine that the portion of 
Minnesota’s predatory offender registration statute that 
prescribes the “intentional” provision of “false information” 
yields a different result in terms of the moral turpitude 
analysis, we should examine his conviction under our 
modified categorical approach.  We employ this approach 
when a statute contains disjunctive elements, some of which 
are morally turpitudinous and others of which are not.  Jean-
Louis, 582 F.3d at 466.  In these instances, the statute is 
  The BIA and IJ thus erred in holding 
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that Totimeh is removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the 
INA.     
IV. Date of Admission 
Totimeh still may be removable under 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA based on his 1988 conviction, 
which clearly was a crime involving moral turpitude, if the 
BIA was correct in using his May 1983 adjustment of status 
as a “date of admission.”  To repeat, it relied on Shanu, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. at 754, in which it held that the term “admission” 
includes an adjustment of status, and that every date of 
admission qualifies as a potentially relevant date for purposes 
of § 237(a)(2)(A)(i).   
But Alyazji, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 397, undermines Shanu 
by explaining that date of admission “refers to a single date in 
relation to the pertinent offense . . . .”  Id. at 405 (emphasis in 
original).  This “single date” is “the date of the admission by 
virtue of which the alien was present in the United States 
when he [or she] committed [the] crime.”  Id. at 406.  The 
                                                                                                     
“divisible,” and we examine the record of conviction to 
determine under which part of the statute the petitioner was 
convicted.  Partyka, 417 F.3d at 411–12.   
The conviction record does not specify whether Totimeh was 
convicted for “knowingly violat[ing]” the statute or for 
“intentionally provid[ing] false information.”  Minn. Stat. 
§ 243.166.5 (1998).  Under these circumstances, we analyze 
the offense under “the sub-section requiring the least 
culpability,” Mehboob, 549 F.3d at 275, which, per the 
Minnesota statute, is the “knowingly violates” prong.  For the 
reasons noted above, a conviction under that prong is not a 
crime of moral turpitude.    
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BIA established the following test to determine removability 
in connection with a date of admission: 
[T]o ascertain an alien’s deportability under 
[§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA], we look first to 
the date when his crime was committed.  If, on 
that date, the alien was in the United States 
pursuant to an admission that occurred within 
the prior 5-year period, then he is deportable.  
Conversely, the alien is not deportable if he 
committed his offense more than 5 years after 
the date of the admission pursuant to which he 
was then in the United States.  Moreover, under 
this understanding of the phrase “the date of 
admission,” the 5-year clock is not reset by a 
new admission from within the United States 
(through adjustment of status).  Rather, such a 
new admission merely extends an existing 
period of presence that was sufficient in and of 
itself to support the alien’s susceptibility to the 
grounds of deportability.   
Id. at 406–07 (emphasis added in part).  Stated simply, once 
an alien is in the United States legally, the five-year clock 
starts.  Later adjustment of the reason that the alien may stay 
does not restart a clock that never stopped.   
 For example, the petitioner in Alyazji was admitted to 
the United States as a nonimmigrant in 2001.  He remained in 
this country thereafter, and in 2006 his status was adjusted to 
that of a lawful permanent resident.  In 2008, he was 
convicted of indecent assault.  The BIA held that he was not 
convicted of the offense within five years of his “date of 
admission” because his 2006 adjustment of status “added 
nothing to the deportability inquiry; it may have extended or 
reauthorized his then-existing presence, but it did not change 
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his status vis-à-vis the grounds of deportability.”  Id. at 408 
(emphasis in original).  The BIA noted as well that an 
overstay or other violation of nonimmigrant status would not 
change the outcome if the person entered the United States 
legally:  “We now make clear that such an overstay or 
violation would have no effect on our analysis under 
[§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i)].”  Id. at 407 n.8 (emphasis in original).  It 
contrasted this with the outcome if the petitioner had entered 
the United States without inspection (that is, illegally), and 
then adjusted his status in 2006:  “In that case, the date of 
adjustment would have triggered the running of the 5-year 
clock because it would have commenced (rather than 
extended) the respondent’s then-current period of presence in 
the United States following an admission.”  Id. at 408 n.9 
(emphasis in original).  
 Despite this unequivocal holding that is directly 
applicable to Totimeh’s situation, the BIA surprisingly found 
him removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) because he was not 
“readmitted,” but was present in the United States pursuant to 
his May 1983 adjustment in status.  Erroneously citing the 
BIA’s statement regarding initial entry without inspection, the 
Government argues that the BIA’s application of Alyazji is 
correct because Totimeh was “out of status” as of September 
8, 1982, given that he was not enrolled in a full course of 
study at that time, and thus his May 1983 adjustment of status 
“commenced” his presence in the United States.   
But based on the BIA’s explicit holding in Alyazji, 
regardless whether Totimeh was “out of status,” his 1980 
admission was valid, and he remained in the United States 
through his adjustment of status in May 1983.  His date of 
admission did not stop and restart then.  The BIA thus 
misapplied its unambiguous precedent in Alyazji by holding 
that evidence of Totimeh’s 1980 admission is immaterial to 
the § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) analysis.  Moreover, as the Government 
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implicitly acknowledges, the evidence demonstrates that 
Totimeh was inspected and admitted legally in July 1980.  
Because his 1988 conviction for criminal sexual conduct in 
the fourth degree was more than five years after this date of 
admission, he is not removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of 
INA.        
V. Conclusion 
For these reasons, we grant Totimeh’s petitions for 
review, reverse the BIA’s holding that he is removable under 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA, vacate the order of removal, 
and remand to the BIA with instructions to reopen the case to 
allow Totimeh to supplement the record and to enter an order 
that Totimeh is not removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the 
INA.   
